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EMPLOYMENT LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
Many of the Tenth Circuit's employment decisions in the survey year'
specifically addressed the method by which a plaintiff may prove discrimi-
nation with indirect evidence under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19642 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.3 Initially, this Survey
outlines the allocation and burden of proof in an indirect evidence inten-
tional discrimination case. An analysis of the Tenth Circuit's decisions
demonstrates that although the court continued to lighten the plaintiff's
burden in making out a prima facie case, 4 the court departed from prece-
dent and significantly increased the plaintiff's burden at the pretext
stage.
5
In interpreting the prima facie requirement, the Tenth Circuit ad-
hered to the Supreme Court's warning that the prima facie case was
"never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."6 Accordingly, the
court continued to treat the plaintiff's burden as flexible and minimally
demanding. Most importantly, in Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods,
Inc.,7 the court concluded that a plaintiff need not prove equal or better
qualifications than the person selected to satisfy the prima facie case. 8 Ad-
ditionally, in Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.,9 the court decided that the plaintiff's
failure to apply formally for the position at issue did not defeat the prima
facie case. 10 After Whalen, a showing that the employer had notice of the
plaintiff's status as one who might reasonably be interested in the job, or
of the fact that the plaintiff sought employment, will serve to satisfy the
prima facie case. 1
These court decisions addressing the requirements of the prima facie
case must be contrasted with the court's decisions that imposed a more
stringent pretext burden on the plaintiff. The court confronted the pre-
1. The survey year covers decisions handed down between September 1, 1992 and De-
cember 31, 1993.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The methodologies for proving inten-
tional discrimination discussed in this survey are also used in proving intentional discrimina-
tion under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See Drake v. City of Fort
Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1163 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. See infra parts I.A., II.A.
5. See infra parts I., II.B. Once the employer has rebutted plaintiff's prima facie case, a
finding of intentional discrimination depends on plaintiff's success in showing pretext. A
finding of pretext indicates that the reasons offered by the employer were not the real rea-
sons for the employment decision, but an attempt to mask the consideration of impermissi-
ble factors.
6. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
7. 997 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1993).
8. Id. at 797.
9. 974 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1417 (1993).
10. Id. at 1251.
11. See id.
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text issue in an indirect intentional discrimination case in EEOC v. Flasher
Co., 12 and held that a mere finding of disparate treatment,1 3 without a
showing that it was the result of intentional discrimination based on pro-
tected class characteristics, does not prove a violation of Title VII. 14 The
Tenth Circuit's ruling in Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc.,15 reinforced the
heavy pretext burden articulated in F/asher and detailed the nature of the
more stringent "pretext-plus" requirement for plaintiffs.
16
By tracing the evolution and clarification of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, 17 this Survey criticizes both the court's inconsistent interpreta-
tion of the framework and the court's movement towards increased bur-
dens on plaintiffs at the pretext stage. The Tenth Circuit's pretext
decisions will be discussed in light of the Supreme Court's recent clarifica-
tion of the indirect evidence framework in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks.18 The Survey concludes that the heightened burdens imposed by
the Tenth Circuit render the McDonnell Douglas framework useless, since
indirect evidence alone, without the anticipation and defeat of all other
possible reasons for the employer's decision, will not support an inference
of intentional discrimination.
I. THE INDIRECT EVIDENCE INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION CASE:
BACKGROUND
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196419 is "to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discrimina-
tory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job, envi-
ronments to the disadvantage of minority citizens." 20 Although Title VII
does not guarantee ajob to each person, it requires "the removal of artifi-
cial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification." 2' Congress emphasized that other civil rights
guaranteed in the Act mean little without the right "to gain the economic
wherewithal to enjoy or properly utilize them."2 2 Specifically, Title VII
12. 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992).
13. See infra note 24.
14. F/asher, 986 F.2d at 1314.
15. 992 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. See infra note 44.
17. The Supreme Court established the indirect evidence framework for Title VII claims
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
20. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
21. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
22. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 29 (1964), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.CA.N. 2355, 2516. The House Report went on to state that "[a]side from the political
and economic considerations, however, we believe in the creation ofjob equality because it is
the right thing to do. We believe in the inherent dignity of man. He is born with certain
inalienable fights. His uniqueness is such that we refuse to treat him as if his rights and well-
being are bargainable." Id. at 30.
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prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.
2 3
To prove intentional discrimination under Title VII, the plaintiff
must show disparate treatment.2 4 A plaintiff may prove disparate treat-
ment by offering express, 25 direct,26 or indirect 27 evidence of intentional
discrimination.
A. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2 8 the Court, in an effort to clarify
the appropriate inquiry in an indirect evidence intentional employment
discrimination case, allocated the burden of production and established
an order for the presentation of proof. Under the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the plaintiff in a Title VII case carries the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 29 To establish a prima
facie case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a racial
minority, (2) she was qualified and applied for an available position, (3)
23. Section 703(a) (1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent
part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)
(1988).
Congress delegated the primary responsibility of preventing and eliminating unlawful
employment practices to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id.
§§ 2000e-4(a), 5(a).
24. Disparate treatment is one of two methods recognized by the Supreme Court for
proving individual discrimination under Title VII. Disparate treatment exists where the "em-
ployer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
335 n.15 (1977). "[D]isparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII." Id.
The other method of proof, disparate impact, "involve[s] employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but ... fall more harshly on one group
than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Id.
25. Express evidence of employment discrimination would be an explicit statement by
an employer indicating discriminatory intent (i.e. "I will not hire you because you are a wo-
man"). See Roberto L. Corrada, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Much Ado About Nothing? I
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Denver Law Review).
26. Consistent statements made by an employer to his employees that he dislikes African
Americans, coupled with the fact that an African American has never received a promotion
in the respective workplace, is an example of direct evidence of discrimination. The phrase
"smoking gun" is also used to characterize direct evidence. See Gilbert M. Roman, Proving
Intentional Discrimination in Employment Cases Through Indirect Evidence: The Supreme Court Clari-
fies the Rules, 42 TRIAL TALK 6 (1993).
The mixed-motive case, in which a plaintiff shows that an employer considered both an
impermissible factor and a legitimate factor in making the employment decision, is a direct
evidence case properly analyzed under the framework established in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
27. Indirect evidence is best understood as circumstantial evidence. See 2 ARTHUR LAR-
SON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.19, at 10-6 (1993).
28. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). "[T ] he Court deliberately used this case as the occasion and the
vehicle for the promulgation of a general rule designed to bring order out of a chaotic situa-
tion that had developed within the lower courts." LARSON & [ARSON, supra note 27, § 50.10,
at 10-4.
29. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
1994]
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she was rejected for the position, and (4) the position remained open.
3 0
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, "[t] he burden then
must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for the employee's rejection."
3 1
If the employer carries its burden, the plaintiff then has an opportu-
nity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate rea-
sons offered by the employer were only a pretext for discrimination.
3 2
Relevant to showing pretext is evidence regarding the employer's treat-
ment of the individual employee during the term of employment, the em-
ployer's reaction to lawful civil rights activities, the employer's general
policy regarding minority employment, and a statistical showing of a pat-
tern of discrimination by the employer.
3 3
B. Refining the Framework
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,3 4 the Court clari-
fied the McDonnell Douglas framework by detailing the relevant burdens.
3 5
In confronting the plaintiff's initial burden, the Court stressed the impor-
tance of a prima facie showing, which creates an inference of discrimina-
tion "only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible fac-
tors."3 6 The prima facie case establishes a mandatory, rebuttable pre-
sumption3 7 that shifts the burden of production, not persuasion, to the
defendant.38 The nature of the defendant's burden must be "understood
30. Id. Although the Court stated the requirements for a prima facie case in a refusal to
hire context, the Court explicitly stated that "[t] he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII...
and the specification above ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
Accordingly, the federal courts have since adapted the prima facie case to accommodate
a number of employment contexts. See, e.g., Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025
(10th Cir. 1993) (retaliation); Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1988)
(discharge and age discrimination claim); McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249
(10th Cir. 1988) (discharge); Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 773 F.2d 1116, (10th
Cir. 1985) (layoff); Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1983) (failure to pro-
mote); Worthy v. United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1980) (discipline); Long v.
Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974) (denial of training); Lanegan-Grimm v. Library
Ass'n, 560 F. Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983) (compensation); Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
456 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (transfer).
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
32. Id. at 804.
33. Id. at 804-05.
34. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
35. For a more detailed discussion of the individual burdens in a disparate treatment
case, see Mack A. Player, The Evidentiay Nature of Defendant's Burden in Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment Cases, 49 Mo. L. lEv. 17 (1984).
36. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)). The prima facie case also serves to eliminate the two most common nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection: (1) no available positions, and (2) plaintiff is un-
qualified for an available position. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 358 n.44 (1977).
37. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
38. Id. at 254-55. Prior to Burdine, the nature of the defendant's burden remained un-
defined by the Court. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 27, § 50.32(a), at 10-38 to 10-44.
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in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and intermediate burdens."3 9 To rebut
the prima facie case, the defendant need not persuade the court of its
nondiscriminatory reasons, but must produce enough evidence to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to the plaintiff's claim of discrimination. 40 If the
defendant remains silent in the face of the presumption, however, the
court must enter judgment for the plaintiff.
4 '
In discussing the burden shift back to the plaintiff, the Court noted
that if the defendant meets the burden of production, "the prima facie
case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specific-
ity."42 To meet the final burden of persuasion, the plaintiff must prove
that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the defendant's ac-
tion. The plaintiff may succeed in proving intentional discrimination
"either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
than likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the em-
ployer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."4 3 The proposi-
tion that a plaintiff may prove pretext solely by discrediting the
defendant's proffered reasons proved to be the most controversial aspect
of the Burdine decision.
4 4
39. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff." Id.
40. Id. at 254-55. The purpose of the defendant's burden of production is both to pres-
ent a "legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so
that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Id. at 255-56.
41. Id. at 254. It is particularly important that the Court addressed the weight of articu-
lations not admitted into evidence and concluded that such an articulation will not meet the
defendant's burden. Id. at 255 n.9.
42. Id. at 255.
43. Id. at 256. Although Burdine's two-prong test uses the terms "indirectly" or "directly,"
the plaintiff still uses indirect, circumstantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination.
When employing the "more likely motivated" prong, the plaintiff directly (affirmatively)
proves discrimination through the use of circumstantial evidence. When employing the "un-
worthy of credence" prong, the plaintiff proves discrimination without an affirmative show-
ing that the defendant more likely was motivated by impermissible factors. Marina C.
Szteinbok, Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title VI Disparate Treatment Claims
After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1118 n.34 (1988).
44. Following Burdine, the circuit courts adopted one of two interpretations: (1) the
pretext only" rule which embraced the "unworthy of credence" prong, and (2) the "pretext-
plus" rule which prohibited a plaintiff from establishing pretext with a mere showing that the
employer is lying. The "pretext-plus" courts require a showing of pretext, plus proof that no
other legitimate factor was responsible for the employment decision. For a detailed discus-
sion of the differences between the two approaches, see Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant
Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
Although several circuit courts were slow in interpreting Burdine's "unworthy of
credence" prong, the "pretext only" rule eventually emerged in eight different circuits. See
Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1988); MacDissi v. Valmont
Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988); Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d
1537, 1549 (10th Cir. 1987); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 319-20 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 784 F.2d 1407
(9th Cir. 1986); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir.
1985).
The "pretext-plus" rule was articulated by four circuit courts. See Spencer v. General
Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health &
1994]
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C. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Clarifying Burdine
In light of the controversy in the circuit courts regarding the "unwor-
thy of credence" prong of Burdine, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to hear St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.45 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, held that the trier of fact's rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons does not compel a judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.
46
Reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision,4 7 the majority noted that while
discrediting the employer's proffered reasons may prove pretext, it does
not, by itself, prove that the employer's actions were a "pretext for discrimi-
nation."48 Justice Scalia admitted that the decision directly contradicted
the "unworthy of credence" language in Burdine, but concluded that the
Burdine Court's suggestion that a mere showing of unworthiness could suf-
fice to prove pretext was an "inadvertence" on the part of the Court.
49
The Court's rejection of Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong indi-
cates that plaintiffs must not only prove their own case, but must also con-
vince the trier of fact that no other possible reasons for the employment
action exist.50 In his dissent, Justice Souter warned that the imposition of
such a severe burden would cause a "scouring the record" problem as the
trier of fact may look beyond the presented evidence in search of unarticu-
lated, although completely legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the
employment action.
5 1
Arguably, St. Mary's essentially gutted both the rationale and the ef-
fect of Burdine.5 2 By eliminating Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong,
the McDonnell Douglas framework no longer "permits the plaintiff meriting
Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987);
White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042-43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984); Clark v.
Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983).
Although the Sixth Circuit originally adhered to the "pretext only" rule, the court re-
cently shifted to a "pretext-plus" notion. See Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d
275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 (1992).
45. 113 S. Ct. 954 (1993).
46. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
47. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993). The Eighth Circuit had concluded that once the plaintiff discredited each of the
employer's proffered reasons, a judgment for the plaintiff was compelled as a matter of law.
Id. at 492.
48. St. May's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752. The Court stressed that while discrediting the em-
ployer's reasons does not compel a finding of discrimination, such a showing, accompanied
by a strong prima facie case, may allow an inference of intentional discrimination. Id. at
2749.
49. Id. at 2752-53.
50. The Court stated that Title VII only awards damages against those employers who
are proven to have taken the adverse action based on impermissible factors. Id. at 2756.
Furthermore, "[t]hat the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously con-
trived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason ... is correct." Id.
51. Id. at 2761-63 (Souter, J., dissenting). Although the majority downplayed this possi-
bility by noting the Burdine requirement that the defendant's articulation must be admitted
into evidence, the Court failed to address adequately the issue of the unarticulated reason.
Id. at 2755.
52. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:4
EMPLOYMENT LAW
relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination" through indirect
evidence.
53
II. TENTH CIRCUIT CASE LAW
A. The Prima Facie Case
Following the McDonnell Douglas decision, the Tenth Circuit consist-
ently has adhered to the notion that the plaintiff's "burden of establishing
a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous."54 As articulated
in McDonnell Douglas, to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must show
that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she applied and was
qualified for an available position, (3) she was rejected, and (4) the posi-
tion remained open following her rejection. 55 During the survey year, the
court confronted the most challenging aspect of the prima facie case, the
application/qualification requirement,56 and continued to lighten the
burden on plaintiffs at that stage.
57
1. Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc.
5 8
In Hooks, the plaintiff, an African American, brought suit against his
employer alleging discriminatory failure to promote. 59 In accordance
with a company-wide reduction in force, Diamond eliminated the con-
verting coordinator position, a position occupied by the plaintiff.60 Hooks
expressed interest in the position of production supervisor, but was reas-
signed to assistant production supervisor. The production supervisor posi-
tion went to a white male, and several months later Hooks' position was
eliminated. 6 ' The district court, relying on Allen v. Denver Public School
Board,62 concluded that Hooks failed to prove a prima facie case of dis-
crimination and granted summary judgment for the defendant.63 Con-
cluding that the trial court applied the wrong standard for a prima facie
case, the Tenth Circuit stated that "the best approach is to remain consis-
tent with the prima facie elements laid out in McDonnell Douglas and Bur-
53. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
54. Id. at 253.
55. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
56. "The question whether a particular plaintiff.., fulfills the qualification requirement
or not is often the central issue in cases involving the McDonnell Douglas prima facie formula."
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 27, § 50.31(c), at 10-25 to 10-26.
57. While the cases offered expected clarification of the prima facie case, the court's
treatment of the prima facie case offers an interesting comparison with the court's treatment
of the plaintiff's burden at the pretext stage. See infra part II.B.
58. 997 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1993).
59. Although not relevant to this discussion, the plaintiff also alleged constructive dis-
charge and failure to contract on a nondiscriminatory basis in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988). Hooks, 997 F.2d at 796. The court also briefly addressed the plaintiff's claim of
discriminatory demotion. Id. at 799-800.
60. Id. at 795.
61. Id. Hooks subsequently accepted Diamond's offer of early retirement. Id. at 795-96.
62. 928 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1991).
63. Hooks, 997 F.2d at 796-97.
1994]
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dine."6 4 Thus, in establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff "need not
show that he or she is equally or better qualified than the person selected
for the position."65 On the contrary, in order to shift the burden of pro-
duction to the defendant, the plaintiff need only show that he or she is
qualified for the position.
66
The court, in addressing the importance of the plaintiff's qualifica-
tions, stressed that the investigation properly occurs at the pretext stage,
where the relative qualifications of the applicants serve to illuminate the
employer's reasons for the decision. 6 7 Since the trial court inappropri-
ately considered Hooks' relative qualifications at the prima facie stage, the
court reversed the trial court's conclusion that Hooks failed to make out a
prima facie case. 68 Because Hooks failed to prove pretext,69 however, the
court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
7 0
2. Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.
In Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc.,7 1 the court confirmed that the prima facie
application requirement merely requires a constructive showing of appli-
cation. In that case, the plaintiff, a sixty-three year old man, brought suit
alleging age discrimination. 72 Following a restructuring of the defendant
corporation, John Whalen, an employee of eleven years, was fired. Subse-
quently, the corporation hired a twenty-nine year old man to replace
Whalen. On the basis of indirect evidence, 73 the jury found for the
plaintiff.
64. Id. at 797. In Allen, the court held that a plaintiff must show that she was "equally or
better qualified than those employees actually promoted" to establish a prima facie case.
Allen, 928 F.2d at 984 (quoting Clark v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 731 F.2d 698 (10th
Cir. 1984)). Although not explicitly overturning Allen, the court cautioned that the case
must "not be read to increase the prima facie burden established in McDonnell Douglas."
Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797.
65. Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797.
66. Id. If the plaintiff, however, shows that the person actually hired was significantly
less qualified, this will be of great assistance both in showing that the plaintiff's own qualifica-
tions met the minimum requirements for the job and in offering evidence of pretext. LAR-
SON & LARSON, supra note 27, § 50.31 (c), at 10-28.
67. See Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797. The term "qualification" consists of two distinct notions:
(1) absolute qualification suggests that the plaintiff possesses the minimum requirements for
the job and is facially qualified; and (2) relative qualification refers to the individual's qualifi-
cations compared with those of the other applicants for the position. See generally Alisa D.
Shudofsky, Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in Title VII Litigation, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 553 (1982).
68. See Hooks, 997 F.2d at 797.
69. Id. at 798. The record failed to indicate that Hooks was the better candidate for the
position. The promoted individual possessed a similar amount of supervisory experience. Id.
70. Id. at 799-800.
71. 974 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1992).
72. Age discrimination claims are brought under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Although not a Title VII claim, the
McDonnell Douglas framework has been adapted to this context. See EEOC v. Sperry Corp.,
852 F.2d 503, 507 (10th Cir. 1988).
73. See Whalen, 974 F.2d at 1250. Evidence produced at trial indicated that, prior to the
acquisition, a list of employees was generated in declining order of age and delivered to the
vice president of the company. One witness testified that the president had expressed his
intent to hire a young controller. Id.
[Vol. 71:4
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Affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court
found the jury's conclusion that Whalen established a prima facie case to
be plausible. 74 "Employment discrimination law does not require that a
plaintiff formally apply for the job in question." 75 Instead, the plaintiff
can meet that requirement one of two ways: if formal hiring procedures
are used, the plaintiff must show that the employer received specific no-
tice that the plaintiff was seeking employment; or if informal hiring proce-
dures are used, the plaintiff need only show that he or she was in the
group of people who might be reasonably interested in the position at
issue.
76
3. Prima Facie Analysis
The Hooks decision suggests that while the relative qualifications 77 of
the plaintiff are important in a Tide VII case, they are best addressed at
the pretext stage. Accordingly, the plaintiff's absolute qualifications 78 are
the only factors at issue in the qualification prong of a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination.
79
The Whalen court's "constructive notice" articulation of the applica-
tion requirement offers plaintiffs two new methods of meeting that prong
of the prima facie case. The effect of such a broad standard may be to
encourage individuals who otherwise would not meet the application re-
quirement to pursue employment discrimination claims. Specifically, the
Whalen "constructive notice" standard addresses instances in which an ap-
plicant expresses an interest in the position, is met by an unfavorable em-
ployer reaction, and as a result, ultimately does not submit a formal
application. Application of the Whalen reasoning in such circumstances
will prevent employers from engaging in the subtle discouragement and
suppression of interested potential applicants.
8 0
The Tenth Circuit's commitment to offering plaintiffs a fair opportu-
nity to prove a prima facie case is strong, although not particularly surpris-
74. Id. at 1252.
75. Id, at 1251.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 67.
78. See supra note 67.
79. The court's decision in Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1992),
supports the above analysis. In Kenworthy, the court ruled that a plaintiff, in making out a
prima facie case, could show that she was qualified even when the employer disputed such
qualifications. Id. at 1470. The court properly noted that the employer's reasons for the
employment decision cannot be used to defeat the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. (citing
MacDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1120 (10th Cir. 1991)).
80. Such a case would arise in the following hypothetical situation. An Asian American
woman seeks employment in a traditionally white male workplace. Before formally applying
for a position, she travels to the workplace to get a general sense of the environment. Upon
arrival, she is ignored, perhaps ridiculed, and discovers a noticeable absence of women em-
ployees. She speaks with the employer, expresses an interest in the available position, but is
told that she probably would not enjoy working for this company because of the stress and
time commitment involved.
Provided she was qualified for the position, the constructive notice standard approach
arguably would allow her to make out a prima facie case of sex and/or race discrimination.
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ing. The prima facie case still serves its function of screening out
unsupported claims while providing easy access into the heart of the inten-
tional discrimination claim.
B. Proving Pretext
The court's initial response to Burdines "unworthy of credence"
prong is best characterized as one of indifference. With one notable ex-
ception, 81 the court did not employ the "unworthy of credence" prong
until 1987, in Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.82 Between 1987 and 1992,
the court consistently followed Furr and ruled that the plaintiff could
prove pretext merely by discrediting the employer's proffered reasons.
83
The court's decision in EEOC v. Flasher Co.84 marked a clear departure
from Furr and parallels the Court's abandonment of Burdine in St. Mary's.
1. EEOC v. Flasher Co.
In flasher, Edward Perez, a Hispanic male, was fired by the defendant
after an altercation with another employee. The EEOC brought suit on
behalf of Perez, alleging that Perez was fired in violation of Title VII be-
cause he was Hispanic. 85 The employer rebutted the plaintiff's prima fa-
cie case8 6 by claiming that Perez was fired for violating company rules.
Although Perez demonstrated significant disparities in the company's dis-
ciplinary treatment of Perez and non-minorities, 87 the trial court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden in showing pretext.
In a somewhat tortured approach, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court.8 8 Perhaps the most startling aspects of the case come from the in-
ternal inconsistencies in Judge Ebel's reasoning. Initially, Judge Ebel
81. See Beck v. Quiktrip Corp., 708 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1983). After citing the "unworthy
of credence" language of Burdine, the court concluded that the duty of the trial court is to
"decide which party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes." Id. at 535 (quot-
ing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
82. 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987). The court narrowed the pretext inquiry by stating
that "[t] he critical question for the jury is whether it believes the defendant's proffered rea-
sons for the employment decision, rather than the plaintiff's assertion of impermissible dis-
crimination." Id. at 1549.
83. See Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d 1507, 1512 (10th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that the plaintiff
must focus on the defendant's proffered reasons when proving pretext); Denison v. Swaco
Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that one of the ways a
plaintiff may prove intentional age discrimination is by discrediting the employer's reason for
the employment decision); Krause v. Dresser Indus., 910 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir. 1990) (con-
cluding that the plaintiff need only show that the employer's reason is unworthy of credence
to prove pretext).
84. 986 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 1315.
86. The appropriate prima facie showing in a claim relating to termination for violation
of a work rule is established if the plaintiff shows that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, (2) he was terminated for violation of a company rule, and (3) non-minority
employees who are similarly situated were treated differently. Id. at 1316 (citing McAlester v.
United Air Lines, 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988)).
87. See id. at 1316. Perez presented five separate instances where non-minorities re-
ceived only verbal reprimands, suspensions, or demotions following company rule violations.
Id. at 1315.
88. See id. at 1316.
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seemed to follow Tenth Circuit precedent when he stated that the defend-
ant's burden of production
defines the parameters of the trial, as the plaintiff then knows the
precise reason that he or she may try to show is only a pretext for
an illegal discriminatory motive. By articulating the reasons for
the plaintiff's termination, the defendant eliminates a myriad of
possible reasons that would otherwise have to be addressed.8 9
Indeed, this language reinforces the notion that the defendant must artic-
ulate the reasons for the decision and that the plaintiff must respond to
those reasons in order to prove pretext.90
An important distinction for Judge Ebel was the difference between
the reason for the decision and the reason for the disparity in treatment.9 1
This distinction allowed Judge Ebel to conclude that the employer need
not explain the differential treatment of minorities and non-minorities in
terms of rational business policies. Even irrational or accidental differ-
ences of treatment may not compel a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion.92 Such a rationale accounted for the holding of the case: "a mere
finding of disparate treatment, without a finding that the disparate treat-
ment was the result of intentional discrimination based upon protected
class characteristics, does not prove a claim under Title VII.
' '9 3
Judge Ebel's unprecedented dissection and reformation of the dispa-
rate treatment claim was enhanced by his dilution of the "unworthy of
credence" prong. After failing to cite any of the Tenth Circuit precedent
that followed Burdine literally,9 4 the court concluded that a finding that
the defendant's reasons are pretextual does not compel a finding of dis-
crimination unless shown to be a "pretext for discrimination against a pro-
tected class."95 To support such a conclusion, the court relied on the
rationale that "[p]roffered reasons may be a pretext for a host of motives,
both proper and improper, that do not give rise to liability under Title
VII. '" 9 6 In light of the above, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial
89. Id. at 1318. Judge Ebel stressed that "there is no limit to the potential number of
reasons that could be raised at trial." Id. The defendant is required to enunciate the reasons
for the employment decision to prevent "needlessly confused and delayed" litigation of dis-
crimination claims. Id.
90. See Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir. 1991). It is interesting to note thatJudge
Ebel served on the panel that decided Bell
91. Judge Ebel clarified that the defendant must only address the reason for the deci-
sion against the plaintiff in step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, while the reason for
the disparity between the plaintiff's treatment and that of other employees is appropriately
addressed by the plaintiff in stage three. See Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1319 & n.7.
92. Id. at 1320.
93. Id. at 1314.
94. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. Instead of relying on Tenth Circuit
precedent, Judge Ebel cited cases from the "pretext-plus" courts of the Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits. Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321.
95. Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1321. This is essentially the same holding reached by the
Supreme Court in St. Maty's. See supra part I.C.
96. Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1321. To justify such a conclusion, Judge Ebel initially com-
mented on the inherent complexities of human relationships. See id. at 1319. He noted the
error in assuming "that differential treatment between a minority and a non-minority em-
ployee that is not explained by the employer in terms of a rational, predetermined business
policy must be based on illegal discrimination" in violation of Title VII. Id. at 1319-20. On
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court was not compelled to enter judgment for the plaintiff upon a show-
ing of unexplained differential treatment.
97
The opinion suggests that the trier of fact may need to scour the rec-
ord to locate some of these acceptable reasons in case the employer fails to
articulate the "real" reason for the decision due to the sensitivity of the
issue.98 Such sensitive non-articulations may include personal animus, fa-
voritism, grudges, random conduct, or procedural errors.
9 9
a. Comparison: Flasher and St. Mary's
As the decision in Flasher preceded the Supreme Court's decision in
St. Mary's, Judge Ebel's opinion may have influenced Justice Scalia's opin-
ion. Judge Ebel struggled with the "pretext" verses "pretext for discrimina-
tion" distinction made in Burdine and concluded that the latter constituted
the proper showing.' 0 0 Justice Scalia reached the same result after an ex-
tended discussion of what the Court really "intended" to convey in Bur-
dine.10 1 The scouring the record problem clearly presented itself in
Flasher'0 2 and was a key issue in Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in St.
Mary's.10 3 Judge Ebel's articulation of improper verses proper motives,
10 4
the contrary, apparently irrational differential treatment that cannot be explained on the
basis of clearly articulated company policies may be explained by a number of factors: (1) the
discipline was administered by different supervisors; (2) the events occurred at different
times when the company's attitudes were different; (3) the individualized circumstances of-
fered mitigation for the infractions less severely punished; (4) the less severely sanctioned
employee was more valuable to the company for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons; or
(5) "the inevitability that human relationships cannot be structured with mathematical preci-
sion." Id. at 1320.
97. See id. at 1322.
98. See id. at 1321 (citing Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health & Developmental
Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987)).
This conclusion must be compared to contrary statements in Bell v. AT & T, 946 F.2d
1507, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991). In reversing the trial court, the Bell court faulted the lower
court's reliance on an unarticulated reason to support a finding for the defendant. "[W]hen
the trial court relies on what it considers to be a legitimate reason not articulated by the
employer to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. .. a plaintiff does not have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext .... " Id. The Bell court's conclusion clearly forbids the
fact finder from straying out of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework. By relying on
unarticulated reasons, the trial court in Bell effectively denied the plaintiff the right to mount
a formidable challenge at the pretext stage. See supra note 41 for similar reasoning by the
Burdine Court.
99. See Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321 (citing Benzies, 810 F.2d at 148).
100. See id.
101. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993). Justice Scalia con-
cluded that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown
both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." Id. In light of
that two-part necessity, Justice Scalia noted that where the Burdine Court merely stated the
word "pretext," one must reasonably understand such language to refer to "pretext for dis-
crimination." See id.
102. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
103. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that:
under the majority's scheme, a victim of discrimination ... will now be saddled with
the tremendous disadvantage of having to confront, not the defined task of proving
the employer's stated reasons to be false, but the amorphous requirement of dis-
proving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder might find lurking
in the record.
Id.
104. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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although not confronted by Justice Scalia in detail, was also reflected in
the St. Mary's decision.10 5
That is not to suggest that the two opinions do not differ in important
aspects. Judge Ebel failed to acknowledge that his opinion disturbed prior
Tenth Circuit acceptance of Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong. The
first half of Judge Ebel's opinion seemed to suggest a continued accept-
ance of Burdine.'0 6 His ultimate betrayal of the "unworthy of credence"
prong seemed misplaced, as he directly contradicted earlier statements.
Indeed, one wonders if Judge Ebel even realized the true importance of
the opinion or understood the inherent contradictions in his rationale.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, realized the need to confront Bur-
dine head on and devoted much of his opinion to showing that the "un-
worthy of credence" prong was merely inadvertence on the part of the
Burdine Court.10 7 Yet, instead of overturning Burdine, the St. Mary's Court
merely discredited the opinion. Such a backhanded approach may lead to
an abandonment of Burdine's overwhelming acceptance in the circuit
courts. 108
2. Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc.
Although in retrospect, the language in Flasher proved to be a signifi-
cant blow to the ability of claimants to prove pretext, the effect of the
opinion was accentuated by the court's ruling in Sanchez v. Philip Morris,
Inc.10 9 In Sanchez, the court reversed the district court's finding of reverse
and national origin discrimination. The plaintiff, a Hispanic male,
brought suit under Title VII after he was refused employment in the de-
fendant's company on three different occasions. 110 After noting that Raul
Sanchez made out a prima facie case, 1 1 and that the defendant success-
fully rebutted the presumption, 112 the court concluded that the district
court erred in finding that the plaintiff proved pretext.
113
105. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2751 n.5. The Court stated that it would be "a mockery of
justice to say that if the jury believes the reason [the employer] set forth is probably not the
'true' one, all the other utterly compelling evidence that discrimination was not the reason
will then be excluded from the jury's consideration." Id.
For a critical analysis of Justice Scalia's reasoning, see Corrada, supra note 25.
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. See St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2751-55.
108. See Corrada, supra note 25, at 18-19 (criticizing Justice Scalia's treatment of Burdine
and predicting future credibility problems for the Court's decisions).
109. 992 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1993).
110. Sanchez applied for an entry level sales position three times with Philip Morris. It
was undisputed that he met the minimum requirements for the position-that the applicant
be twenty-one years old and possess a valid driver's license. Id. at 245. In each of the three
instances, Caucasians were hired for the positions. Id.
111. Sanchez established a prima facie case in the failure to hire context by showing that
he was a member of a protected class, was qualified for an available position, and was rejected
for a position that was ultimately filled. Id.
112. The employer merely articulated that Sanchez was not the "best qualified for any of
the three positions." Id. at 246.
113. The trial court erroneously concluded that the individual hired for the third posi-
tion was less qualified than Sanchez. The circuit court criticized that conclusion because the
difference in the two applicants' qualifications was due to different individual work exper-
iences. See id. at 247.
19941
DENVER U /VERSITY LAW REVIEW
The court initially emphasized that "the plaintiff in a Title VII case
must prove that intent to discriminate based upon plaintiff's protected
class characteristics was the determining factor for the allegedly illegal em-
ployment decision." 114 The court then concluded that after a plaintiff
successfully proves that the defendant's reasons are unworthy of belief,
"the plaintiff must still prove that the true motive for the employment de-
cision violates Title VII." 115 After finding that the plaintiff failed to prove
that the employer's decision was not motivated merely by a mistake, favor-




As both Hasher and Sanchez demonstrate, the Tenth Circuit has ele-
vated the burden on the plaintiff during the pretext stage from a "pretext
only" burden to a "pretext-plus" burden.1 17 It is no longer enough to dis-
prove and/or discredit the defendant's articulated reasons for the employ-
ment decision. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that perhaps the only,
and certainly the determining, factor leading to the decision was the em-
ployer's reliance on an impermissible discriminatory reason. Such a stan-
dard exceeds even Justice Scalia's articulation in St. Mary's,118 and in fact,
encourages factfinders to search the record to make sure no other reasons
exist that would justify the defendant's decision. Essentially, such a stan-
dard eliminates the need for the defendant to meet the burden of produc-
tion in good faith." 9 Arguably, it makes no difference what sort of
114. Id. at 246-47 (emphasis added) (citing EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
115. Id. at 247. "Because the prima facie case only creates an inference of unlawful dis-
crimination, some evidence that the articulated legitimate business reason for the decision
was pretextual does not compel the conclusion that the employer intentionally discrimi-
nated." Id. (citing Rasher, 986 F.2d at 1321).
The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1075 (1994). In Kendall, the court affirmed the dis-
trict court's entry of summary judgment against the plaintiff's Title VII claim. Id. at 849.
The court used the pretext requirement articulated in Sanchez to conclude that the plaintiff
failed to show that sex discrimination was the true motive for the defendant's employment
decision. See id.
116. Sanchez, 992 F.2d at 248. The court rested its conclusion on the basis of the trial
court's failure to equate the differences in qualifications with discrimination. Instead, the
trial court considered the differences in qualifications, standing alone, to be sufficient to
support a judgment for the plaintiff. See id. at 247-48.
117. See supra note 44.
118. As St. Mary's offers a less harsh pretext standard than Rasher, plaintiffs' attorneys will
attempt to use the limited holding of St. Mary's to argue that an "unworthy of credence"
demonstration still allows an inference of intentional discrimination. Such an approach,
although reasonable, may be met with mixed success in the Tenth Circuit. Most likely, the
Court will remain extremely hesitant to infer, or uphold an inference of, discrimination
based only on the establishment of the prima facie case and disproof of the employer's ar-
ticulated reasons.
119. Justice Souter, in his St. Mary's dissent, addressed the new incentive employers would
have to lie in meeting the burden of production. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.
Ct. 2742, 2764 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). If a defendant remains silent at the produc-
tion stage, judgment for the plaintiff is compelled as a matter of law. Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Thus, employers who fail to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision "not only will benefit from lying, but
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evidence the defendant offers if the factfinder1 20 is allowed, even in-
structed, to scan the record.
C. Assessment of Plaintiff's Overall Burden
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiff's initial burden is
minimal seems somewhat obvious and expected. The court's stringent
pretext requirement, however, serves to minimize any advantage gained by
the plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Initially, by recognizing the
factfinder's prerogative to search for any nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision, whether articulated by the defendant or not, the
court has effectively erased the defendant's burden. The burden of pro-
duction fails to define the scope of the inquiry, and arguably, no longer
serves a useful purpose. Moreover, the plaintiff must now anticipate all
reasons that may be articulated by the employer and the unarticulated rea-
sons that the factfinder may rely upon after scouring the record.
The elimination of Burdine's "unworthy of credence" prong com-
pounds the severe burden. Proof that the employer lied in its justifica-
tions for the employment action fails to establish that those reasons were
merely a pretext for discrimination. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer's consideration of an impermissible factor was the only rea-
son for the decision. Such a severe standard of proof will discourage fu-
ture employment discrimination claims for a number of reasons. The
need to disprove both the employer's articulated and unarticulated de-
fenses will result in a significant increase in discovery expense. Addition-
ally, plaintiffs will not succeed unless exceptionally strong circumstantial
evidence substantiates their claims. As a result, attorneys may hesitate in
representing the plaintiff with a legitimate complaint but only minimal
proof.
Arguably, this "pretext-plus" burden shatters the McDonnell Douglas
framework and seems to beg the indirect evidence question. Plaintiffs,
after progressing through the McDonnell Douglas framework designed to
help them prove intentional discrimination indirectly, must still essentially
prove direct intentional discrimination. Indeed, for practical purposes,
the McDonnell Douglas framework as clarified by Burdine has lost all mean-
ing in the Tenth Circuit.
must lie to defend successfully against a disparate treatment action." St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at
2764 (Souter, J., dissenting). By offering false evidence, the employer meets the prima facie
case and can hope that the factfinder will search the record for an unarticulated reason that
may offer a nondiscriminatory explanation for the decision. Id.
120. In future cases, the "factfinder" will likely be a jury. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
allows either party in an intentional discrimination case under Title VII to demand a jury
trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(c)(1) (Supp. III 1991).
The Supreme Court recently concluded, however, that the Act does not apply retroactively.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit has witnessed dramatic changes in the application
of the McDonnell Douglas framework since the Burdine clarification.
Although the plaintiff's prima facie burden continued to lighten during
the survey year, the court developed a more stringent pretext standard in
Flasher. The court also embraced that standard in Sanchez, thus ensuring
the Tenth Circuit's commitment to the Rasher rationale. Plaintiffs in the
Tenth Circuit now face one of the harshest pretext burdens in the nation.
Subsequent Tenth Circuit opinions are unlikely to deviate from Flasher,
particularly since the Supreme Court decided St. Mary's soon thereafter.
As a result, in order to support an inference of intentional discrimination,
attorneys must maneuver through the "new improved" McDonnell Douglas
framework to prove, directly, through the use of indirect evidence, that im-
permissible factors motivated the employer's decision.
Charlotte N. Sweeney
